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 This thesis explores the cogency of Gregory Boyd’s so-called “neo-Molinist” account of 
the openness of the future.  In particular, it is an investigation into whether Boyd’s Square of 
Opposition for future contingents provides a model of reality for free-will theists that can 
preserve classical conceptions of (i) omniscience, (ii) logic, and (iii) morally significant freedom.  





 Thanks to my director, Tom Senor, for his enthusiasm, patience, and encouragement 
throughout the course of this project. 
 And a special thanks to Peet’s Coffee & Tea, without which I might and might not have 




To the patient ones, Amy and Olivia. 
 
 

















 In recent years, a debate has been raging among theologians and philosophers of religion 
over the question of whether God could, in principle, know what a free agent would or would not 
do on any particular occasion.  On one school of thought, what I shall hereafter refer to as 
“classical Molinism,”
1
 the answer is yes.  Specifically, the defining claim of classical Molinism 
is this: for any possible agent S and circumstance C that God might choose to instantiate, God 
knew, logically prior to his decision to create, that were S in C, S would freely do act A (or, as 
the case may be, would not do A).  That God has “middle knowledge” of such counterfactuals of 
creaturely freedom—or, for brevity, CCFs—is the assumption upon which the entire Molinist 
enterprise depends.
2
   
Others, however, don’t share this assumption.  One problem in particular with the 
classical Molinist conception of CCFs, they say, is that it is not altogether clear how God could 
know these subjunctive conditionals given the kind of freedom they presuppose.  After all, 
conditionals of this sort are supposed to be about the libertarian, and therefore indeterministic, 
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 More specifically, Molina’s theory was that, in addition to God’s natural knowledge of 
everything that could be, and his free knowledge of all contingent truths that will be, God 
possesses “middle knowledge”—i.e., hypothetical knowledge of what, if he were to actualize a 
particular world, would be.  On this picture, such knowledge is thought to be pre-volitional since, 
like God’s natural knowledge, it occurs logically prior to his decision to create.  But unlike his 
natural knowledge, which includes within its scope all necessary truths, the content of God’s 
middle knowledge is contingent.  Indeed, it was the great theological innovation of Molina to 
locate facts about what creatures would freely do in any circumstance—so-called counterfactuals 
of creaturely freedom—among the set of contingent truths that combine to comprise God’s 
middle knowledge.  Though he has no control over what counterfactual conditionals are true, the 
idea was that, by conceiving of God’s hypothetical knowledge of creaturely free decisions as 
being explanatorily prior to his creative decree, God would be in a position to plan and thereby 
meticulously govern a world that is, nevertheless, populated by libertarian free agents.  For an 
illustration of the basic idea sketched above, see Figure 2 below.   
2 
 
free actions of persons.  But if the circumstances C in which S chooses to, say, do A are non-
determining—as they must be if S’s choice is to be considered free—then nothing about the laws 
of nature or the state of the world leading up to the moment of S’s decision will be sufficient to 
guarantee that S chooses A rather than not-A.  Indeed, as Anthony Kenny notes, “for an 
indeterminist, points in any story where a free choice is made are precisely points where the 
story has two different and equally coherent continuations.”
3
  Thus a question naturally arises: 
What indication could God possibly have, prior to S’s actual decision, that S would choose this 
way rather than that way?  While not absolutely decisive against the Molinist position, worries 
like this have proven serious enough that it has seemed to a growing number of philosophers that 
what is true (and, hence, knowable) prior to God’s creative decree is not that S definitely would 
or would not do A in C but, rather, that S might or might not do A in C.
4
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 Anthony Kenny, The God of the Philosophers (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), 68. 
 
4
 A related worry has always been the question of what could explain or ground the truth 
of these conditionals.  Such truths cannot be accounted for by appealing to God’s will, for 
instance, since to do so would amount to theological determinism, something Molinists want to 
avoid.  Nor would it seem that they could be made true by the actual decisions of the agents 
themselves; for CCFs are about non-actual persons, persons who do not yet exist (and, in many 
cases, will never exist).  In the absence of any other candidates, however, it looks as if we are left 
with an unappealing conclusion, namely that nothing grounds these truths.  This is, of course, the 
(in)famous “grounding problem.”  For a detailed and more formal articulation of this particular 
objection, see Alexander Zambrano, “Truthmaker and the Grounding Objection to Middle 
Knowledge,” Aporia 21, no. 2 (2011): 19-34, and William Hasker, “Counterfactuals and Evil: A 
Final Reply to R. Douglas Geivett,” Philosophia Christi 5, no. 1 (2003): 237-40.  For a sampling 
of Molinist responses to the grounding objection, see Thomas Flint, Divine Providence: The 
Molinist Account (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998), chap. 5; William Lane Craig, 
“Middle Knowledge, Truth-Makers, and the Grounding Objection,” Faith and Philosophy 18, 
(2001): 337-52; and Edward Wierenga, “Providence, Middle Knowledge, and the Grounding 
Objection,” Philosophia Christi 3, no. 2 (2001): 447-57.   
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One of the more interesting proposals to emerge along these lines has been a view called 
“neo-Molinism.”
5
  According to neo-Molinists, when it comes to the free actions of agents, 
God’s middle knowledge cannot be assumed to pertain solely to what these agents “would” or 
“would not” do since such propositions—being contraries rather than contradictories—do not 
exhaust the range of possibilities.  Logically speaking, the contradictory of “S would do A in C” 
is not “S would not do A in C” but “S might not do A in C.”  Similarly, “S would not do A in C” 
is contradicted by “S might do A in C.”  Because of this, there is a logically distinct class of 
conjointly true “might and might not” propositions among the content of God’s middle 
knowledge.  Supposing then that God decides to create a world with persons capable of free 
choice, the resultant indeterminacy from granting such a capacity would then extend beyond 
divine middle knowledge and come to form a part of the very structure of the world God chose to 
create and know.  Among other things, this would mean that the future is, to some degree, 
“open” for us and God.  God’s foreknowledge, like his (logically) prior middle knowledge, 
would now correspond, not just to what “will” and “will not” occur, but, significantly, to what 
“might and might not” occur as well. 
This thesis explores the cogency of the neo-Molinist account of the openness of the 
future.  In particular, it is an investigation into whether the relation between future contingent 
statements asserting what “will,” “will not,” and what “might and might not” occur, as conceived 
by neo-Molinist Gregory Boyd, provides a model of reality for free-will theists that can preserve 
classical conceptions of (i) omniscience, (ii) logic, and (iii) morally significant freedom.  In what 
follows, I argue that it can. 
                                                          
5
 The primary architect of this view, and the one responsible for its title, is Gregory A. 
Boyd.  See Boyd, “Neo-Molinism and the Infinite Intelligence of God,” Philosophia Christi 5, 
no.1 (2003): 187-204. 
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Of course, not everyone has agreed that it can (let alone that it does).  The task of this 
essay, therefore, is primarily one of defense.  Specifically, I will be defending Boyd’s open 
future Square of Opposition from one of neo-Molinism’s more vocal rivals, the classical Molinist 
philosopher, William Lane Craig.  Here’s the overall structure of what’s to come.  I’ll first 
introduce and locate neo-Molinism within the broader context of Christian theism.  I’ll then 
begin to articulate some senses in which the neo-Molinist conceives of the openness of the 
future, noting some similarities and, ultimately, one major difference between how they and 
classical Molinists think of the future as being “open.”  After locating this difference, I’ll then 
illustrate the open future Square of Opposition, a logical-semantical model of the nature of the 
future from a neo-Molinist’s perspective.  From there, I switch to defense, offering five potential 
justifications for the logical relationships that obtain on the Square in the face of Craig’s more 
recent criticisms.  In the process, I show how the Square allows free-will theists a vision of 
reality that not only maintains classical conceptions of omniscience and logic, but one that 
provides a more perspicuous account of majority libertarian intuitions as well.   
II. 
 
 Before taking a look at how the neo-Molinist understands the nature of the future, it 
would be beneficial to spend a moment getting clear on a few defining (theological) features of 
neo-Molinism more generally.  First and foremost, a neo-Molinist is a theist.  Unlike polytheists 
or, say, pantheists however, neo-Molinists are theists of a broadly classical sort.  Alan Rhoda 
defines “broadly classical theism” as “the view that there is a unique personal being (God) who 
exists necessarily, who possesses a maximal set of compossible great-making properties, 
including omnipotence, omniscience, and perfect goodness, and who created the world ex nihilo 
5 
 
and can unilaterally intervene in it as he pleases.”
6
  Within the stream of this venerable tradition 
is, moreover, a small but established strand of theistic belief to which neo-Molinism properly 
belongs.  That strand is the theological school of thought that has generally come to be known as 
open theism.
7
  As Rhoda puts it, the “open” in open theism refers to two general aspects of 
openness—the openness of God, and the openness of the future.
8
  The latter will be addressed in 
the sections to follow.  But, first, a quick word about the neo-Molinist conception of the 
openness of God.   
Like all open theists, what makes neo-Molinists unique among their classical brethren is 
their belief that the future is, as of now and in some respects, epistemically open for God.  Let S 
stand for “God.”  Then, using brackets “< >” to denote propositions (e.g., <x> is to be read: “the 
proposition x”), we can adopt the following formal analysis of divine epistemic openness: 
Divine Epistemic Openness Thesis: The future is epistemically open for some 
person(s)
9
 S at time t if and only if for some state of affairs x and some future time t
*
 
                                                          
6
 Alan R. Rhoda, “The Fivefold Openness of the Future,” in God in an Open Universe: 
Science, Metaphysics, and Open Theism, ed. William Hasker, Thomas Jay Oord, and Dean 
Zimmerman (Eugene, OR: Pickwick Publications, 2011), 69, n1. 
 
7
 While the term “open theism” is of relatively recent vintage (see Clark Pinnock, et al., 
The Openness of God: A Biblical Challenge to the Traditional Understanding of God (Downers 
Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1994)), the theological view to which it refers is at least as old as 
Protestantism itself.  For research which locates openness thinking at multiple points within and 
throughout Church history, see Tom Lukashow’s “Open Theism Timeline” (April 2013) and 
extensive bibliography compiled at http://theopenview.org/historical-research/ (accessed June 
25, 2014). 
     
8
 Rhoda, “The Fivefold Openness of the Future,” 69. 
 
9
 This addition is mine.  I allow for both a singular and plural reading of “person” to 
leave room for those monotheistic traditions which would conceive of God as one person (e.g., 
Islam, Judaism) as well as those monotheists who have, historically, understood the one God as a 
threefold manifestation consisting in Father, Son, and Holy Spirit (e.g., the Christian doctrine of 
the Trinity).  While open theism has primarily been a movement within Christian theology, the 
theme of divine epistemic openness has periodically been affirmed in other faith traditions as 
well.  See, for instance, Michael Lodahl, “The (Brief) Openness Debate in Islamic Theology: 
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neither <x will obtain at t
*
> nor <x will not obtain at t
*
> (nor their tense-neutral 




With respect to the above definition, Rhoda adds the following commentary: 
 
 The adverb ‘infallibly,’ and clause (ii) at the end, are there to avoid trivialization.  It is,  
after all, boringly obvious that the future is epistemically open to fallible beings like 
ourselves.  Epistemic openness only becomes an interesting and controversial thesis when 
it concerns an essentially perfect and infallible knower, like God…As for (ii), a timeless 
God has no temporal properties and stands in no temporal relations and so cannot know 
anything at a time.  Since…advocates of divine timelessness don’t want to be committed 




 Hence given that neo-Molinism is a form of open theism, I shall, for the purposes of this 
essay, use the titles “neo-Molinism” and “open theism” interchangeably.  Importantly, however, 
the neo-Molinist account of the future being explored here is what could plausibly be called a 
conservative version of open theism.  By identifying the neo-Molinist position as “conservative,” 
I mean to highlight a certain attraction this account of openness potentially affords for those free-
will theists of a (generally) classical bent by drawing attention to the fact that, over against some 
other varieties of open theism, neo-Molinism aligns more closely with conservative or 
“classical” conceptions of omniscience and logic.  For instance, as will become clear below, 
despite the fact that the future is epistemically open for God, God’s knowledge (omniscience) is, 
according to the neo-Molinist, an attribute that nevertheless corresponds perfectly to reality.  
Significantly, there’s no truth that the God of neo-Molinism fails to know.  Nor is there any 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
And Why that Debate Should be Different among Contemporary Christians,” in Creation Made 
Free: Open Theology Engaging Science, ed. Thomas Jay Oord (Eugene, OR: Pickwick 
Publications, 2009), 53-68.  See, too, Jewish thinkers such as Joshua Hoffman and Gary S. 
Rosenkrantz, The Divine Attributes (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2002), and the medieval 
philosopher, Gersonides (Tamar Rudavsky, “Gersonides,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy (Spring 2011), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2011/entries/gersonides/ 
(accessed October 11, 2014)). 
 
10
 Rhoda, “The Fivefold Openness,” 75. 
 
11
 Ibid., 75-6. 
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falsehood that he doesn’t know to be false.  Additionally, over the course of defending this view 
of the future from critics, what I hope to demonstrate is that not only can the neo-Molinist argue 
their position from metaphysical theses widely held among classical theists, but, contrary to what 
is commonly supposed, they are able to do so without having to abandon standard systems of 
logic. 
With these clarifications in place, I now turn to an explication of the neo-Molinist 
account of the openness of the future.      
III. 
 
Besides being epistemically open for God, the neo-Molinist holds that the future is, in 
some sense, itself open.  But in what sense exactly?  Initially, one natural answer the neo-
Molinist will give here is a response that any free-will theist would endorse, namely that the 
future is causally open.  To think that the future is causally open is just to suppose that the laws 
of nature, together with a complete specification of the world’s history up to a certain point in 
time, do not “fix” (that is, do not determine) all future facts beyond that point.  This thought is 
captured in the following thesis. 
Causal Openness of the Future Thesis: The future is causally open relative to time t if 




What makes the belief in a causally open future a natural one for neo-Molinists is that 
such openness follows straightaway from a core conviction that, as we’ve already seen, both they 
and classical Molinists share, i.e., the conviction that human agents have been endowed with 
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  Indeed, echoing Kenny’s earlier observation, Craig confirms that “Given 
libertarian freedom, the course of events later than any time t is not determined by the causes 
operative up until t.  A free choice at t will result in different events after t depending on what is 
chosen.”
14
  Thus, if the future is genuinely open in a causal sense, then the future is not 
nomologically determined.  Quite simply, such an account of openness means that there are 
future contingents.  On this much, classical and neo-Molinists are agreed. 
Still, one might argue that just because the past and present, together with the laws, do 
not fix all future facts, it does not strictly follow that there are no such facts.  Oliver Pooley, for 
instance, claims that “In tenseless terms, there can be a unique actual continuation of the world to 
the future of some time t, but this continuation need not be the only one compatible with the 
actual laws and the way the world is up to and including t.”
15
  Here Pooley is raising the point 
that one could hold to causal indeterminism while, nevertheless, subscribing to an eternalist or B-
theoretic view of time.  Now this point is not uncontentious, but arguing against it would take us 
far beyond the scope of this paper.
16
  Instead, what is important for our purposes here is to note 
that open theists overwhelmingly embrace the notion of objective temporal becoming—that is, 
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 Of course, causal openness could also result from other factors such as, say, quantum 
indeterminacy.  Here and throughout, however, I will primarily be thinking of indeterminacy in 
relation to human libertarian freedom. 
  
14
 Craig, “Response to Gregory A. Boyd,” in Four Views on Divine Providence, ed. 
Dennis W. Jowers (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2011), 227. 
  
15
 Oliver Pooley, “Relativity, the Open Future, and the Passage of Time,” in Proceedings 
from the Aristotelian Society 113, no. 3 (2013): 337. 
 
16
 For starters, to successfully argue that causal indeterminism would absolutely rule out 
an eternalist view of time would, as Rhoda points out, “require defending a robust causal theory 
of time according to which time flow consists in the absolute becoming of new world states as a 
result of prior world states.”  Rhoda, “The Fivefold Openness,” 88.  Though such a project 
cannot be tackled here, I will, however, second Rhoda’s bibliographic advice by referring the 
reader who is interested in seeing such a project developed to Michael Tooley’s, Time, Tense, 
and Causation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997).     
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they embrace a tensed theory of time.  Unlike tenseless theories, such dynamic or A-theoretic 
views of time reject the idea that there exists, at some time t, a “unique actual continuation of the 
world to the future of…t.”
17
  In other words, in addition to being causally open, the neo-Molinist 
maintains that the future is ontically open: 
Ontic Openness of the Future Thesis: The future is ontically open relative to time t if 
and only if the world state at t does not stand in an earlier than relation to a unique and 




Now what is interesting is that, besides believing in a causally open future, many 
classical Molinists agree with the neo-Molinist that the future is ontically open as well.  In fact, 
Craig is one of them.  Here Craig elaborates on what he and everyone else who believes in an 
ontically open future means to affirm. 
According to this theory, the future is not on an ontological par with the past and the 
present.  Whereas things in the past and the present have been actualized, the future is 
pure potentiality.  This is because temporal becoming is an objective feature of reality.  





The fact that Craig agrees with the majority of open theists on this point, however, 
actually serves to highlight a fundamental disagreement that he and other classical Molinists 
                                                          
17
 Well, almost all A-theorists reject this.  One version of the A-theory, the so-called 
“moving spotlight” view of time, actually attempts to combine eternalism with a form of 
objective, temporal flow.  For more details see Bradford Skow, “Relativity and the Moving 
Spotlight,” The Journal of Philosophy 106 (2009): 666-78, and idem, “Why Does Time Pass?” 
Noûs 46 (2012): 223-42.  
 
18
 Rhoda, “The Fivefold Openness,” 73.  Depending on the theory in question, the 
condition that, as of a given time t, no single or unique future obtains may be met in more than 
one way.  For instance, one could hold that there is no unique future because there is no future 
whatsoever (e.g., Tooley, Time, Tense, and Causation) or because, say, the future contains a 
branching topology in which multiple “branches” are thought to exist either concretely (e.g., 
Storrs McCall, A Model of the Universe: Space-Time, Probability, and Decision (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1994) or as abstract possibilia (e.g., Craig Bourne, A Future for Presentism 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006)). 
 
19
 Craig, “Response to Gregory A. Boyd,” 227.   
10 
 
have with the neo-Molinist’s understanding of what it ultimately means for the future to be open.  
For recall that, unlike the neo-Molinist, Craig and other classical Molinists are not open theists 
since they reject the idea that the future is epistemically open for God.  What this means is that 
even though they believe in the reality of future contingents (that is, even though they believe in 
the reality of potential future events which, given a tensed view of time, do not yet exist and, so, 
are not, as Craig says, somehow “waiting” up ahead for us), still, like all non-open theists, they 
insist that God nevertheless knows everything that will eventually occur.  In other words, despite 
agreeing with Kenny’s sentiment that points in any story where a free choice is made are 
precisely points where the story has “two different and equally coherent continuations,” the 
classical Molinist will argue that such indeterminism needn’t preclude the possibility of God’s 
knowing which continuation will, in fact, be the actual one.  In short, neither the reality of future 
contingency nor the truth of an ontically open future rules out the presence of a unique actual 
future “story line.” 
It is the contention of the neo-Molinist, however, that the existence of such a story line is 
ruled out by the aforementioned theses.  And this brings out a fundamental dispute between what 
I am here calling “neo” and “classical” (free-will) theisms.  The dispute is over the question of 
whether, out of a myriad of causally possible futures that could come to pass, there’s one that is, 
nevertheless, privileged as being the actual future.  Could there be, as it were, a “thin red line” 
running through all of the causally open futures, highlighting the unique actual way things will 
be?  The neo-Molinist says no.  The classical Molinist says yes.  And the difference in their 
answers is broadly the result of a disagreement over the metaphysical assumption that truth 
supervenes on being (TSB).   
11 
 
According to TSB, every (contingent) truth is true in virtue of what exists, such that any 
difference in what is (contingently) true would have to be accompanied by a difference in what 
exists.  If one accepts this principle—as the neo-Molinist does—then, given the assumption that 
the future is both causally and ontically open, it would seem that there is not enough being for a 
complete, true story of the future to supervene upon.  Or, as Rhoda clarifies,  
[I]f the future is ontically open, then a complete, true story of the future can’t supervene 
on future events, for they don’t exist.  And if the future is causally open, then it can’t 
supervene on past or present events plus causal laws and concurrent divine causal 
contributions, for all that together leaves underdetermined which causally possible future 
shall come to pass.
20
   
 
On the other hand, when probed as to why they answered “yes” to the above question, 
Craig and other classical Molinists typically reveal some sort of deep dissatisfaction with TSB-
like principles.
21
  And so, when asked what could account for the existence of a unique actual 
future in the absence of any determining factors, the answer that the classical Molinist often ends 
up giving seems to look a lot like “nothing.”  Whether this answer is ultimately acceptable or not 
is what Patrick Todd identifies as the core metaphysical dispute between the two camps.
22
   
Fortunately, it is not the purpose of this essay to settle the dispute over TSB.  Initially, my 
task is simply a descriptive one.  I’m trying to get the neo-Molinist’s view of the future on the 
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 Rhoda, “Open Theism and other Models of Divine Providence,” in Models of God and 
Alternative Ultimate Realities, ed. Jeanine Diller and Asa Kasher (New York, NY: Springer, 
2013), 294.  Cf. Idem., “The Fivefold Openness,” 82-3. 
    
21
 Usually, the complaints seem to be directed against truthmaker theory, i.e., the idea 
that for every true proposition p, there is something in reality that “makes” p true.  But TSB is a 
weaker thesis than truthmaker, one that Graham Oppy has called “a pretty secure piece of 
metaphysical doctrine” (see Oppy, “Arguments from Moral Evil,” International Journal for 
Philosophy of Religion 56 (2004): 69).  Nevertheless, for a sustained attack on TSB and similar 




 Patrick Todd, “Future Contingents are all False! On Behalf of a Russellian Open 
Future,” Mind (forthcoming). 
12 
 
table.  The agenda after that is to defend the view from recent criticism and, in the process, 
demonstrate why such a view seems to accord better with basic libertarian intuitions.  To get a 
bit clearer on what the neo-Molinist thinks a genuinely open future looks like, then, I turn back 
to Pooley who (helpfully) describes a view of the future that any neo-Molinist would recognize 
and identify as theirs. 
Several advocates of the open future…claim that true openness requires, not just that the 
future not be (nomologically) determined, but that it also be not fully determinate.  And 
one popular way of cashing out what lack of determinateness means focuses on the status 
of future possibilities.  When one has mere nomological openness of the future, there are, 
as of a time, many possible futures compatible with the indeterministic laws, but they are 
not all created equal.  One among them corresponds to the actual future.  The others are 
therefore ways the actual world might have been (consistent with its past and laws), but 




“For example,” Pooley continues, 
 
it cannot both be true that there will not be a sea battle tomorrow but that there might be 
one (in the relevant, non-epistemic sense of ‘might’).  The open future view now under 
consideration, therefore, insists that, for them all to be genuine possibilities, none from 
amongst them is now singled out as what will take place.  This leads naturally to 
‘branching time’ models of reality: tree-like structures, the nodes of which correspond to 
spatially global instants.  The branches are intended to represent the plurality of 
possibilities to the future of each of the nodes from which they branch. 
 Given such a structure, there are many ways to construct semantics for tensed 
(and modal) sentences relative to the structure’s instants…Suppose that, as of now, it is 
an open possibility whether there will be a sea battle tomorrow: in some possible futures 
such a battle occurs, in others it does not.  In such circumstances, the semantics should 
secure the truth of both of the following: 
 There might be a sea battle tomorrow. 
 There might not be a sea battle tomorrow. 
One might also reason that, whichever open possibility comes to pass, either there will be 
a sea battle or there won’t be.  That is, 
 Either there will be a sea battle or there won’t be 
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should also come out as true.  However, since it is supposed to be genuinely unsettled, as 
of now, whether there will be a sea battle, neither of the following claims should count as 
true: 
 There will be a sea battle tomorrow. 
 There will not be a sea battle tomorrow.24 
What Pooley accurately identifies here is a defining feature of the neo-Molinist’s 
understanding of the nature of the future—the idea that a truly open future is one that is “not 
fully determinate” (a concept that will be further clarified below).  We’re also presented with a 
set of criteria that any adequate semantics for future contingents on such a model of the future 
ought to meet.  So how does the neo-Molinist put all this together?  As it turns out, Boyd’s 
proposal provides an elegant solution, one that is made possible by an underappreciated insight. 
IV. 
 
One of the most distinctive features of Gregory Boyd’s “neo-Molinist” approach to future 
contingent propositions in recent years has been his understanding of the logical relationship that 
obtains between statements asserting what “will” (“will not”) and what “might” (“might not”) 
occur.  The foundation of Boyd’s schema—indeed, the key insight of the neo-Molinist 
understanding of the nature of the future—is the supposition that propositions such as “x will 
occur” and “x will not occur” are not actually contradictories but contraries.  “For the logical 
contradictory of ‘x will occur’ is not ‘x will not occur,’” Boyd writes, “but rather ‘not [x will 
occur],’ which is equivalent to ‘x might not occur.’  So too, the contradictory of ‘x will not occur’ 
is not ‘x will occur’ but rather ‘not [x will not occur],’ which is equivalent to ‘x might occur.’”
25
  
Represented on an Aristotelian Square of Opposition, these relations are laid out as follows: 
                                                          
24
 Ibid., 337-8. 
 
25 Boyd, “God Limits His Control,” Four Views on Divine Providence, 197; cf. Alan R. 
Rhoda, Gregory A. Boyd, and Thomas G. Belt, “Open Theism, Omniscience, and the Nature of 
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                                      might                subcontraries                 might not 
As previously noted, this diagram represents what is, perhaps, the most important 
depiction of the nature of the future from the neo-Molinist’s perspective.  On this semantic 
schema—and the rules governing the square on which it’s modeled—we have the potential for 
three, not just two, logically distinct categories of future-oriented statements: “will,” “will not,” 
and “might and might not.”
26
  Importantly, when describing a future contingent event in terms of 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Reasons for Ascribing Exhaustively Definite Foreknowledge to God: A Historic Overview and 
Critical Assessment,” Religious Studies 46, no. 1 (2010): 41-59.  For an early expositor of the 
specific logical relations being considered here, see Charles Hartshorne’s, “The Meaning of ‘Is 
Going to Be,’” Mind 74, no. 293 (1965): 46-58, and his Insights and Oversights of Great 
Thinkers: An Evaluation of Western Philosophy (Albany, NY: State University of New York 
Press, 1983), 45.   
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 Following the tense logic of Arthur Prior, let “F” stand for the future tense operator “It 
will be the case that.”  Let “M” be a propositional operator for “It might and might not be the 
case that.”  And, finally, let “S” be some state of affairs.  Boyd (using different symbolization) 
then illustrates, explicitly, what is implied by the logical rules of the square.  Namely, that by 
standing in a contrary relation to one another, all three primitive categories—F(S), F(¬S), and 
M(S)—exhaust the field of potential future states.  Thus, one must be true and the other two false 
{(S) [F(S) ˅ F(¬S) ˅ M(S)]}.  From this, Boyd derives the following three theorems: 
 
I.    F(S)  ¬F(¬S) & ¬M(S) 
II.   F(¬S)  ¬F(S) & ¬M(S) 




what “might and might not” occur, the above diagram is meant to model more than just the 
epistemic state of a finite, limited knower.  Rather, it is the neo-Molinist’s conviction that these 
are ontological possibilities, possibilities that, when expressed conjointly, correspond to the 
“open” aspect of the future’s actual metaphysical structure.  As Boyd writes, 
According to this [openness] model, if an agent possesses the free will to choose between 
alternate possibilities, then what is real, prior to the agent’s choice, are the alternate 
possibilities…In contrast to the classical [Molinist] view that assumed the future could be 
exhaustively described by propositions asserting what will or will not come to pass, the 
open view holds that, insofar as agents face ontological possibilities, the future must be 




In what follows, I’ll defend the validity of this square of opposition (hereafter “the  
 
Square”) on both logical and semantical grounds against some recent critiques put forward by  
 




Craig has two general complaints concerning the above depiction of reality.  His first 
objection is directed at Boyd’s notion that, unlike the God of open theism, the God of classical 
theism knows the future exhaustively in terms of “will” propositions.  According to Craig, such a 
characterization “creates a false opposition” between openness and classical theisms since 
Classical theists typically embraced a tensed theory of time and causal indeterminism, 
so…they agreed that agents face ontological possibilities and that there are true 
propositions about what they might or might not do in a causal sense.  But they also 
affirmed that future-tense statements about what will or will not happen are bivalent, that 
is to say, either true or false; for example, ‘Tomorrow Claudius will go to the senate.’  
There is no contradiction whatever in making true, future-tense statements about the 
occurrence of causally indeterminate events…we may agree with Boyd that God knows 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Indeed, to see how there are actually three distinct squares of opposition (each oriented 
around one of these logically possible primitive future states) that can be constructed to form a 
hexagon of opposition, see Boyd, “Two Ancient (and Modern) Motivations,” 52-5, and Boyd, et. 
al “The Hexagon of Opposition: Thinking Outside  the Aristotelian Box” (unpublished 
manuscript) at http://reknew.org/2008/01/the-hexagon-essay/ (accessed 7/25/14). 
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the future as partly comprised of ontological possibilities and, hence, knows the truth-




To unpack this, let’s start with Craig’s contention that, like the openness God, the God of 
classical theism (which, for our purposes, is the Molinist God) does indeed know “might” as well 
as “will” propositions.  As we’ll see in a moment, this is true when understood in a certain way.  
But Boyd has a specific difference between open and classical theisms in mind here.  The 
difference is ultimately over the nature and extent of “determinateness” in reality, particularly as 
that notion applies to the future.  In order to see this, first recall that, on the Molinist picture 
(allowing circles to represent possible worlds), the logical “moments” at which the various stages 
of God’s knowledge occur fall in this order:  
Figure 2 
 
                                  Moment 1: 
 Natural Knowledge: God knows what could be the case. 
 
                                  Moment 2: 
 Middle Knowledge: God knows what would be the case. 
 
 
                      God’s creative decree                                                                                              
 
 
                                  Moment 3: 
                                  Free Knowledge: God knows what will be the case. 
 
In order for God to exercise the kind of providential control over what “will” and “will 
not” come to pass that classical Molinists think he does, it is crucial that God’s creative decree be 
based on his positive knowledge of what creatures would freely do in any circumstance they 
might be placed.  That is, for any type of world that God might create, he would at least need to 
know all of the true CCFs that make up that world.  But according to the classical Molinist, this 
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 Craig, “Response to Gregory A. Boyd,” 227-8.  
17 
 
alone isn’t quite enough to get the job done.  After all, just knowing which counterfactuals are 
true in a given world is not enough to guarantee that God have positive knowledge of what his 
creatures would do.  For, as Thomas Flint points out, it is possible that certain world-types only 
contain negations of counterfactuals of creaturely freedom.
29
  Thus in order to ensure that God 
knows what Molinists think he must know for his providential governance, Flint proposes that 
divine middle knowledge pertains to creaturely world-types (CWTs),
30
 possible worlds with the 
following constitution: 
CWT =def.  T is a creaturely world-type if and only if for any counterfactual of creaturely   
            freedom (C □ A), either (C □ A) or (C □ ¬A) is a member of T.   
 
Here we get an endorsement of the law of conditional excluded middle (CEM)—the 
claim that, for any counterfactual P □ Q (read: “If P were the case, Q would be the case”), 
either (P □ Q) or (P □ ¬ Q) is true.  The law is notoriously controversial,31 but it would 
appear the classical Molinist is committed to something like it, at least when the species of 
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 Flint, Divine Providence, 48.  As we’ll see below, this is exactly the sort of world-type 
the neo-Molinist thinks obtains. 
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 Ibid.  According to Flint, a “creaturely world-type” is to be understood as a “complete 
set of [true] counterfactuals of creaturely freedom.” 
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 One famous detractor was Willard Van Orman Quine.  His much discussed “Bizet and 
Verdi” counterexample to CEM occurs in W. V. Quine, Methods of Logic, 4
th
 ed. (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 1982), 23.  For some (both theologically and non-theologically 
motivated) defenses of CEM, see Charles B. Cross, “Conditional Excluded Middle,” Erkenntnis 
70, no. 2 (2009): 173-88; Richard Gaskin, “Conditionals of Freedom and Middle Knowledge,” 
The Philosophical Quarterly 43, no. 173 (1993): 412-30; Robert C. Stalnaker, “A Defense of 
Conditional Excluded Middle,” in Ifs: Conditionals, Belief, Decision, Chance, and Time, ed. 
William L. Harper, Robert Stalnaker, and Glenn Pearce (Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing 
Company, 1981), 87-104; and Dean A. Kowalski, “On Behalf of a Suarezian Middle 




counterfactual is a CCF.
32
  For as Craig observes, “since the circumstances C in which the free 
agent is placed are fully specified in the counterfactual’s antecedent, it seems that if the agent 
were placed in C and left free with respect to action A, then he must either do A or not do A.  For 
what other alternative is there?”
33
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 Actually Flint has argued that Molinists can get by with a less controversial principle, 
the principle of bivalence.  Alfred Freddoso comments, “Thomas Flint has shown in effect that 
as long as we grant that conditional future events can in principle provide God with ‘positive’ 
information about the activity of indeterministic secondary causes in various hypothetical 
situations, the Molinist can get by…[with the] assumption that necessarily, any potential future 
contingent is such that either it or its compliment obtains” (Freddoso, “Introduction” to Luis de 
Molina, On Divine Foreknowledge: Part IV of the Concordia, trans. Alfred J. Freddoso (Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell University Press, 1988), 51).  As we will see below however, bivalence alone is not 
enough to secure the “settled future” view Flint and company are after.  They also have to 
assume that the law of excluded middle holds for “will” and “will not” propositions which, in 
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Suarez and, even, Molina himself.  See Kowalski, “On Behalf of a Suarezian Middle 
Knowledge,” 219-27; and Freddoso, “Introduction,” 50. 
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 Craig, “Middle Knowledge, Truth-Makers, and the Grounding Objection,” 338.  Craig 
makes a similar remark elsewhere in support of the idea that CEM holds for CCFs.  The idea is 
plausible, he claims, “For we are talking in this case about a very special set of counterfactuals 
involving the choices of some agent in fully specified circumstances.  Such restrictive parameters 
remove the sort of ambiguities that serve to support mere might-counterfactuals” (Craig, 
“Ducking Friendly Fire: Davison on the Grounding Objection,” Philosophia Christi 8 no. 1 
(2006): 163, n4).  Craig’s claim that CCFs can plausibly be thought to be true so long as the 
circumstances described in the antecedent are, in terms of accounting for all the relevant factors, 
“fully specified” is far from obvious however.  On the contrary, given that these conditionals are 
supposed to be about the indeterministic actions of agents, sober philosophical reflection would 
seem to suggest that no amount of (additional) information would be of any help in discerning 
the outcome of what are, through and through, causally indeterminate events.  Dean Zimmerman 
makes the point well: “Many (I would guess most) philosophers simply do not have [Craig’s] 
reaction: when carefully attending to the genuine causal indeterminacy of a certain outcome in 
certain possible circumstances that may never obtain, most of us do not find much plausibility in 
the idea that there is a definite fact about what would happen in those circumstances—at least, 
not a fact that could be known infallibly ahead of time…Throwing in more and more details 
about the situation would strike most of us, I believe, as irrelevant if the details leave the 
situation precisely as indeterministic as ever.”  Zimmerman, “An Anti-Molinist Replies,” in 




Let’s call Craig’s affirmation of CEM, “Craig’s commitment number one” (CC1).   
 CC1: CEM 
Up to this point then, we can see that, whereas the classical Molinist has always held that 
 (1) for any x, if it is the case that x, then it has always been the case that it would be the           
                  case that x, 
and therefore 
 (2) for any x, if it is the case that x, God has always known that it would be the case  
                  that x, 
open future views deny one or both of the above.   
This also helps us to see the first of two important in-house distinctions between open 
theists themselves, distinctions which serve to separate (what I’m calling) the “conservative” and 
“non-conservative” schools within the movement.
34
  The first distinction has to do with 
omniscience.  For instance, although all open theists deny (2), some will still accept (1).
35
  These 
open theists I place in the latter school since they have a difficult time rebutting a common 
accusation against the open view, namely that the God of open theism isn’t truly omniscient.
36
  
Traditionally, to think that God was omniscient was to think (roughly) that God knew all truths 
and believed no falsehoods.  But anyone who denies (2) while, at the same time, admitting to (1) 
                                                          
34
 For helpful taxonomies which highlight relevant differences between distinct types of 
open theism, see especially Rhoda, “Open Theism and Some Varieties Thereof,” Religious 
Studies 44 (2008): 225-34; Dale Tuggy, “Three Roads to Open Theism,” Faith and Philosophy 
24 (2007): 28-51; and Patrick Todd, “Geachianism,” in Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion, 
ed. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2011), 4:222-51. 
 
35
 For example, Richard Swinburne, The Coherence of Theism, rev. ed. (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1993), 180; and Hasker, God, Time, and Knowledge (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 1989), 187. 
 
36
 For one token of this type of charge, see Bruce A. Ware, God’s Lesser Glory: The 




would be calling this conception of God’s knowledge into question.  For on this revised 
understanding of omniscience, there would, at any given time, be truths that God didn’t know.
37
   
But although the complaint that God isn’t omniscient may be applied to these open 
theists, there are many proponents of the open view to which this charge cannot be stuck.  These 
are those open theists who deny (2) and, precisely because they believe God knows all truths, 
deny (1) as well.  It is to this school that the neo-Molinist belongs, and the reason these open 
theists reject both (1) and (2) is because of their commitment to the idea that the future is, to once 
again use Rhoda’s terminology, alethically open.  Rhoda defines “alethic openness” in the 
following way.   
Alethic Openness of the Future Thesis: The future is alethically open at time t if and  
only if for some state of affairs x and some future time t
*
 (i) neither <x will obtain at t
*
> 
nor <x will not obtain at t
*
> is true at t and (ii) neither of their tense-neutral counterparts, 
<x does obtain at t
*
> and <x does not obtain at t
*
>, is true simpliciter. 
   
“Simply put,” Rhoda continues, “the future is alethically open just in case there is no ‘complete 
true story’ depicting a unique series of events as the actual future.”
38
   
Hence, the idea that the future is alethically open is what lies behind the neo-Molinist’s 
conviction that the future is not only non-determined, but also that it is not fully determinate.  
We’ve already seen an argument for why, given TSB, one might plausibly think the future is 
open in this respect, particularly if one also thinks the future is causally and ontically open.  
What the above Square (Figure 1) is meant to show is that such an ontology is in fact logically 
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coherent and, therefore, at least representative of a possible way God might have decreed the 
future to be.   
With this last thesis articulated, the contrast between open and classical theisms that 
Boyd actually had in mind becomes evident.  For since Craig and other traditional Molinists take 
the actual world to be fully determinate or, rather, alethically closed—i.e., to be such that, for all 
possible states of affairs x and all future times t
*
, either <x will obtain at t
*
> or <x will not obtain 
at t
*
> is now true (or alternatively, either <x does obtain at t
*
> or <x does not obtain at t
*
> is true 
simpliciter)—Boyd’s observation that the Molinist God knows the future exhaustively in terms 
of “what will or will not come to pass” seems entirely apropos.   
Of course, in saying that the God of classical Molinism knows the actual future 
exhaustively as a realm of “will” and “will not” propositions, Boyd is not suggesting that there 
are no “might” or “might not” propositions known by God.  For when Craig claims that he and 
other classical Molinists can “agree with Boyd that God knows the future as partly comprised of 
ontological possibilities and, hence, knows the truth-values of ‘might’ as well as ‘will’ 
propositions,” in one sense he’s affirming a rather obvious truth.  For instance, to borrow Craig’s 
example, if it is true that tomorrow Claudius will go to the senate, then it is also true that he 
might go to the senate.  Similarly, if it is true that tomorrow Claudius won’t go to the senate, then 
it is true that he might not go.  In each case the former truth logically implies the latter (just as 
Figure 1 indicates). 
What Craig and other classical theists can’t affirm, however, is the full range of logical 
truths allowed by the Square.  Specifically, the traditional Molinist can’t affirm that an inclusive 
disjunction such as “might or might not,” when true in virtue of both disjuncts being true, 
actually negates both “will” and “will not” propositions.  In other words, on the classical picture 
22 
 
of reality, the conjoint truth of “might” and “might not” statements do not constitute a logically 
distinct category apart from both “will” and “will not.”  But is this not at least logically possible?  
Craig, as we’ll see in a moment, seems to think not.  And if not, then the openness of the future 
represented by Figure 1 couldn’t rise to the status of a metaphysical possibility, an actual way 
things might be.  But, as Boyd notes,  
the most distinctive aspect of open theism is simply its willingness to question why the 
reality God created and perfectly knows must, by metaphysical necessity, be exhaustively 
and eternally settled.  Why must there be a determinate fact of the matter about which 
causally possible future is ‘the’ actual future?  By what metaphysical necessity does the 





In effect, what Boyd is asking here is this: Why think that the future must be alethically closed 
(“settled”) rather than open?  Here’s Craig’s answer. 
He [Boyd] asks, ‘Why must there be a determinate fact of the matter about which 
causally possible future is ‘the’ actual future?’  Two reasons, I think.  First, Scripture 
gives examples of such truths…Second, the logical principle of bivalence requires that 
any statement be either true or false.
40
 
     
It is the second response that we are most interested in here.
41
  Curiously, where Craig 
anchors the (logical) case for an alethically closed future is in the idea that future contingent 
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 Though it is worth mentioning that, regarding the biblical data, Craig’s claim seems 
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Speaking as a non-open theist, evangelical theologian Millard Erickson writes, “A…problem for 
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statements are bivalent.  Indeed, Craig seems to see this as a real point of contrast between open 
and classical theisms, going so far as to claim that “on Boyd’s view, the principle of bivalence 
must fail for future contingent statements, on pain of denying divine omniscience, resulting in the 
logical dislocations entailed by such a denial.”
42
  Now, if Craig is right about this, I would take 
it as a strike against the open view under consideration.  After all, according to the way I’m 
framing it, neo-Molinism is supposed to be a conservative version of open theism, one that does 
justice not only to traditional notions of omniscience but to classical logic as well.  But is Craig 
right? 
Initially at least, there doesn’t appear to be any reason why someone who takes Figure 1 
seriously would need to deny bivalence for future contingents in order to secure an orthodox 
conception of omniscience.  To see why, recall that, according to the above Square, there are 
three categories a putatively future event like Claudius’ outing might fall into:  
(3) Claudius will go to the senate. 
(4) Claudius will not go to the senate. 
(5) Claudius might and might not go to the senate. 
Note that on this view (5) is not equivalent to  
(6) Claudius might or might not go to the senate. 
Proposition (6) could be true if either (3) or (4) is true.  But on the neo-Molinist proposal, (5) is 
only true if both (3) and (4) are false.
43
  Neither Boyd nor any other open theist who holds to this 
framework, then, needs to reject the principle of bivalence since the mere fact that (3) and (4) are 
bivalent does not imply that one or the other is true.  “The reason open theists are accused of 
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denying divine omniscience,” Craig writes, “is because they deny that God knows future 
contingent truths, such as truths about what agents will freely do.”
44
  By assuming that there are 
future contingent truths about what free agents will do, however, Craig’s claim is that either (3) 
or (4) is true, which is to say, not just that they are bivalent but, moreover, that the law of 
excluded middle
45
 holds between these two statements.  This further assumption threatens to beg 
the question against adherents of the above Square since it requires that (3) and (4) be construed 
as contradictory rather than contrary propositions.  In contrast to this, Boyd’s claim is that the 
contradictory of (3) is not (4) but rather 
(4*) It is not the case that Claudius will go to the senate. 
Now one might wonder what possible difference this could make.  After all, (4) and (4*) 
look like synonymous propositions.  And, in natural language contexts anyway (e.g., everyday 
speech), we do not generally distinguish between the inner negation of (3), which is (4), and its 
outer negation, (4*).  But three separate lines of reasoning can be mentioned in support of the 
idea that (4) and (4*) are, in fact, logically distinct propositions.   
The first argument is based on their distinct logical forms.  To begin, let F (read: “It will 
be the case that”) again be a future-tense operator on the present-tense proposition “Claudius 
goes to the senate.”  Given this notation, the obvious analysis of (3), as Craig would agree,
46
 is: 
(3F) F(Claudius goes to the senate). 
What this helps us to see is that the proper negation of (3)—and hence (3F)—is going to 
depend heavily on paying careful attention to the scope of the negation.  For instance, if we 
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require (4) to be the negation of (3), that is to say, if we suppose with Craig that (3) and (4) 
together constitute an instance of p ˅ ¬ p, then, when we go to analyze (4) in terms of the future-
tensed operator, what we’ll find is that to accurately express (4)’s form, which contains an 
internal or embedded negation, F will need to have wide scope over (i.e., will need to be outside 
of) the present-tensed proposition: 
(4F) F¬(Claudius goes to the senate). 
But now it is obvious that (4F) isn’t the negation of (3F).  The reason this can’t be the 
correct negation of (3F) (which is just (3) or, as we’ve been supposing, p) is because (4F) does 
not have the proper form; it is not an instance of ¬ p.  To get the right form, the negation must 
range over the whole proposition p and, so, it is the “¬” operator that needs to have wide scope.  
So understood, the correct negation of (3) is not (4) but (4*), or    
(4*F) ¬F(Claudius goes to the senate) 
which is of the form ¬ p, as required.  Hence, it is (3F) and (4*F)—and their respective 
equivalents, (3) and (4*)—which, being the correct contradictory pair, are rightly construed as    
p ˅ ¬ p.   
Another way to see the difference between (4) and (4*) is to note that, besides their 
distinct logical forms, these propositions can differ in their meaning as well.  Consider, first, the 
fact that the “will” in the phrase “it will be the case that” expressed by the F operator can 
potentially be taken in two ways.  On one reading, “will” is meant to be understood as having 
causal force, i.e., “it is now definitely going to come about that x.”  This is what is sometimes 
called the posterior present tense reading of “will.”
47
  As Dale Tuggy explains, “F[x],” so 
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defined, “makes an assertion about the future and the present.  It asserts that [x] happens down 
the line, and also, the present is such that this will definitely happen; the objective probability of 
[x] happening at some future time or other is presently (and at all future times) 1.”
48
   
Now this was Prior’s (and, before him, Charles Hartshorne’s) preferred analysis of the 
future-tense operator in question, and it is easy to see how (4F) and (4*F), when taken in this 
(posterior present) sense, assert very different things.  For example, on this reading, a proposition 
like (3F) says that “As of now, Claudius will (definitely) go to the senate” or, in other words, in 
all causally possible futures Claudius goes to the senate.  To say that this is untrue, however, is 
not to say that Claudius definitely won’t go to the senate.  That is, from the falsity of (3F) it 
doesn’t follow that there are no causally possible futures where Claudius goes to the senate.  If 
Claudius’ outing is a contingent event, then there are some possible futures where he does and 
some where he does not.
49
  That there are some causally possible futures where Claudius does 
not go to the senate, or that Claudius might not go to the senate, is what (4*F) asserts.  (4F), on 
the other hand, is claiming something stronger; it states that it is now inevitable that Claudius 
will not go to the senate—or, that there are no causally possible futures where he does.  So, 
given the posterior present reading of F, (4F) and (4*F)—and, thus, (4) and (4*)—can be seen to 
have different truth conditions, which means they aren’t, strictly speaking, logically equivalent 
statements.    
Unfortunately, despite the ease with which the posterior present tense reading of F allows 
us to demonstrate a distinction between propositions like (4) and (4*), it is not an interpretation 
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that is likely to be met with wide acceptance.  For this sort of causally-loaded or “now-
inevitable” interpretation is not the only reading “will” admits of.  There is also what we might 
call a merely predictive usage of “It will be the case that,” one whereby we simply mean to make 
an assertion that is purely about the future.  This is what J. R. Lucas (following Hans 
Reichenbach) calls the simple future tense interpretation of “will,” and he contrasts it with the 
posterior present tense reading of the same in the following way.  The simple future of “There 
will be a sea battle tomorrow,” he would say, speaks only about tomorrow—that it is a sea-battle 
day—whereas the posterior present says something about today too, that it is a day-before-a-sea-
battle-day.
50
  Thus, given these distinctions, the assertion that Claudius will go to the senate can 
be understood as “At some future time or other, Claudius goes to the senate” (simple future 
tense) or as “As of now, Claudius will (definitely) go to the senate” (posterior present tense).
51
  
The distinction is an important one, says Tuggy, since 
We can and do make assertions purely about the future which are neutral as to whether or 
not the named event is presently inevitable.  Suppose a pundit predicts: ‘Hillary Clinton 
will be elected U.S. president in [2016],’ and that this is something that at the time of the 
prediction may or may not happen.  We must get beyond what the pundit says to discover 
what she means, what she’s asserting.  Is she asserting that Hillary’s election is now 
inevitable, that is, definitely going-to-be?  She may be.  If so, what she asserts is 
false…But she may not be asserting that.  She may be assuming that the current 
probability of Hillary’s election is somewhat or very high.  The one thing she can’t be 
presupposing (if her thoughts are consistent) is that its probability is now 0.  And quite 
possibly, she’s never even considered the question of how probable Hillary’s future 
election is.  But whatever her stance on the objective probability of Hillary’s election 
presently is, the pundit may simply be forecasting that eventually, Hillary’s election will 
happen.  In this case, her statement is about some future time, and is not also about the 
present.  In this way she can consistently say both ‘Hillary will be elected in [2016]’ and 
‘As of now, Hillary’s election in [2016] may or may not occur.’
52
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From this, Tuggy concludes that 
 
The failure to distinguish between the simple and posterior present manifests in persistent 
confusion that ¬F[x] and F¬[x] make the same assertion.  If we read “F” as simple future, 
these are logically equivalent.  But reading the “F” as posterior present, it is clear that 




According to Tuggy, then, unlike its posterior present interpretation, if we read F as 
simple future, (4F) and (4*F) are logically equivalent (as are (4) and (4*)).  And this means that, 
when taken in this (simple future) sense—a sense that we seem to use quite often—(3F) and (4F) 
would be contradictories.  Moreover, this appears to be Craig’s interpretation of them as well.  
“Here,” Craig tells us, “there are no gaps in the facts, for the statements assert merely that at 
some future time [Claudius’ going or not going] will be the case.”
54
  If this is right, then there 
would appear to be many occasions when the neo-Molinist Square does represent a false 
opposition.  For on the non-causal, merely predictive usage of “will,” future contingent 
statements like (3F) and (4F)—and therefore (3) and (4)—would, contrary to Figure 1, turn out 
to be the correct instance of p ˅ ¬ p after all. 
 This helps us understand why Craig would think that, “on Boyd’s view, the principle of 
bivalence must fail for future contingent statements, on pain of denying divine omniscience.”  
Tuggy, who is an open theist himself, is a case in point.  Like Boyd and other neo-Molinists, 
Tuggy holds that the future is alethically open.  This allows him to say that, despite being 
epistemically open for God, the future is nevertheless perfectly known by God since there are no 
truths that God doesn’t know.  But he also agrees with Craig that (3) and (4) are, on many 
occasions, an instance of p ˅ ¬ p.  Therefore, in order for Tuggy to generate an alethically open 
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future (and hence preserve an orthodox notion of omniscience), he has to deny bivalence (or the 
law of excluded middle).  So, Tuggy ditches bivalence for (simple) future tense propositions, 
thereby succumbing to, as Craig puts it, all the “logical dislocations entailed by such a denial.”
55
  
And he thinks Boyd must do the same.
56
  Here we see Tuggy directing a little friendly fire at 
those open theists who, like Boyd, would like to hold on to both alethic openness and classical 
logic: 
The importance of this distinction is that when it comes to statements about future 
contingents in the posterior present tense, there is no need to deny bivalence, as all such 
claims are presently true or false, as Boyd and Prior argue.  However…we know that as 
of now, when p is a future contingent, reality doesn’t presently feature p happening or not 
happening in the future.  Hence, both ‘it will be that p’ and ‘it will be that ¬ p’ (simple 
future tense) are presently neither true nor false.   
        
So perhaps the neo-Molinist is caught in the dilemma Craig mentions.  Given a plausible 
reading of “It will be the case that,” future contingents like (3) and (4) end up looking like a 
contradictory pair.  But neo-Molinists like Boyd deny that God knows these sorts of future-
oriented statements.  So, “on pain of denying divine omniscience,” the neo-Molinist must forfeit 
classical logic.  Have the hopes for a conservative open theism, then, been sunk?   
Not quite.  Here’s what the neo-Molinist can do to evade the dilemma: show that (4F) 
and (4*F)—even on a simple future tense reading—still aren’t logically equivalent statements.  
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In order to demonstrate this then, recall that, when analyzed in terms of the future tense operator, 
Craig agrees that (3) should be read as: 
(3F) “It will be the case that Claudius goes to the senate.” 
Moreover, the proper negation of (3F), according to Craig, is simply 
 (4F) “It will not be the case that Claudius goes to the senate” 
for again, as he points out, “Here there are no gaps in the facts, for the statements assert merely 
that at some future time [Claudius’ going or not going] will be the case.”   
But Boyd’s contention is that the proper negation of (3F) is actually 
 (4*F) [It is not the case that] “It will be the case that Claudius goes to the senate.”   
Craig, however, wonders whether such a reinterpretation makes any difference at all.  “To say 
that it is not the case that [Claudius’ going to the senate] will be the case,” he observes, “seems 
to be the same as saying that [Claudius’ going to the senate] will not be the case.”
57
  And, indeed, 
as we noted earlier, these statements do appear to be close.  But appearances can be deceiving, 
and, as Todd has recently argued, “in this case…appearances have been deceiving us for quite 
some time.”
58
   
To see why (4F) and (4*F) are really distinct propositions even on the simple future tense 
interpretation of “will,” recall that, on this reading, such propositions are supposed to be solely or 
merely about the future.  Thus, for a future contingent statement like (3F) to be true, all that is 
required is that, in the actual future, Claudius goes to the senate.  For as Craig observes, “what 
else does it mean for a future-tense statement to be true than for things to turn out as the 
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statement says they will?”
59
  In other words, on a simple future tense reading of “It will/will not 
be the case that,” the truth conditions seem to be something like the following: 
Simple Future “Will:” It will be the case that x, if and only if the unique actual future 
features x, 
or 
Simple Future “Will Not:” It will not be the case that x, if and only if the unique actual 
future features not-x. 
   
The important phrase here is “the unique actual future features x (not-x).”  How are we to 
understand the structure of this statement?  At this point, Todd draws our attention to a striking 
parallel between the way we might read this and the way Bertrand Russell, in an old debate with 
P. F. Strawson, understood the statement “The present King of France is bald.”
 60
  Russell and 
Strawson were, of course, embroiled over whether bivalence should apply to such a statement.  
For Strawson, to assert such a thing was to make a sort of category mistake and, therefore, to say 
something that was neither true nor false.  Russell, on the other hand, thought that bivalence 
(here as well as elsewhere) applied.  The way he saw it, anyone who sincerely asserted this 
sentence could only properly be understood as asserting something like the following: 
 There is a present King of France, and he’s bald.  
And it must be admitted that this interpretation seems plausible.  So a statement like “The 
present King of France is bald” was, for Russell, a hidden conjunction, and since its first 
conjunct is false (there is no present King of France), Russell reasoned that this statement should 
be regarded as false.  Similarly, the statement “The Present King of France is not bald” would 
also be false.   
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In the same way, Todd suggests that the simple future tenser who claims that her 
statement is merely “about the future” is, in fact, implicitly quantifying over something that the 
(alethically) open future advocate says doesn’t exist—namely, a unique actual future!  In other 
words, the most natural interpretation of the phrase “the unique actual future features x” seems, 
like Russell’s reading of the above, to be “there exists a unique actual future, and that future 
features x.”  So understood, the truth conditions for (3F) and (4F) would be 
(3Ftrue) “It will be the case that Claudius goes to the senate,” if and only if there exists a 
unique actual future, and that future features Claudius going to the senate 
 
and     
(4Ftrue) “It will not be the case that Claudius goes to the senate,” if and only if there exists 
a unique actual future, and that future does not feature Claudius going to the senate. 
 
As with the present King of France example, this, too, seems like a reasonable 
interpretation of “the unique actual future features x.”  Indeed, the idea that the simple future 
advocate is, in the back of their mind, really thinking that there exists a unique actual future 
“story line” to the world can be seen in the way they tend to view the phenomenon of 
retrospective prediction.  Appeals to this phenomenon are often invoked against open futurists in 
an effort to show that our practice of retroactively assigning truth to predictions made in the past 
demonstrate an alethically closed future.  For example, when it comes to our attitudes about 
future contingent propositions, Edwin Mares and Ken Perszyk point out that  
We argue about such conditionals and even sometimes bet on them.  Suppose that two 
people at the sidelines of the [2016] presidential race—John and Cindy—are betting with 
each other about what a particular candidate will do.  John might be that [Hillary] will 
refuse to invite [Lewinsky], and Cindy might bet that [Hillary will invite her]…if Hillary 
is elected, then if she bars [Lewinsky] from the White House we would count John as 
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Thus, the simple future tense uses of “will” and “will not” are, it would seem, quantifying 
over a unique actual future.  And so, for the open futurist, propositions like (3F) and (4F)—and 
therefore (3) and (4)—simply come out false.  And this shows why (4F) and (4*F) can, even on a 
simple future reading, be regarded as distinct propositions.  In order for (4F) to be true, it would 
seem that there needs to be a unique actual future, i.e., a “complete true story” about the way 
things will go.  But (4*F) could be true even if there isn’t such a thing or, for that matter, even if 
there never were (and perhaps never will be) anyone named Claudius.  Therefore, even on a 
simple future tense interpretation, (4F) and (4*F) can plausibly be seen to have different truth 
conditions, which means that it is (3F) and (4*F)—and thus, ultimately, (3) and (4*)—which are 
the correct contradictory pair.  So, just as the Square shows, neo-Molinists can have their 
bivalence and omniscience too. 
Craig, however, is not unaware of this sort of move.  To those who would appeal to 
reference failure in order to establish the falsity (and, thus, the contrariety) of “will” and “will 
not” propositions, Craig, employing the statement “William Willis will be president in 2050” as 
an example, thinks one can respond in either of two ways:  
[A] Before creating the world, God knew all the logically possible worlds he could 
create, populated by all the logically possible individuals he could create.  William Willis 
is a member of some of those possible worlds, and in some of them he is president in 
2050.  Since God knows which world he has created, he knows whether or not the actual 
world is a world in which Willis will be president.  Hence, individuals who do not yet 
exist can be identified on the basis of God’s knowing all logically possible worlds, all 
logically possible individuals, and the world and individuals he has chosen to create. 
 
[B] We can…conceive of the present as branching off into various directions, each 
representing a different possible future course of events.  By providing complete and 
accurate descriptions in terms of genealogy, place, time, and so forth, we can pick out 
possible individuals on particular branches.  Of course, we do not know which branch 
represents the actual future, but that does not stop us from referring to nonexistent 




individuals and making statements about them.  Hence, a statement about William 





 But here it is obvious that, in each case, Craig has simply begged the question against the 
neo-Molinist (the offending passages have been italicized).  In response [A], Craig simply 
assumes that a possible world has to be alethically closed.  But the whole point of Figure 1 is to 
illustrate the logical possibility that a world could be alethically open.  True, such a world 
wouldn’t qualify as a “maximal possible state of affairs,” and so, by Alvin Plantinga’s definition 
at least, wouldn’t enjoy the distinction of being called a “possible world.”
63
  But so what?  
Plantinga’s definition is merely stipulative, and the fact that the Square represents a logically 
coherent scenario means that such a definition cannot be applicable to all possible world-types.  
Some worlds are not “fully complete” in terms of what “will” or “will not” come to pass.  As 
Boyd puts it, from the neo-Molinist’s perspective, 
if God chooses to create a world in which some conjoined might-counterfactuals are true, 
he is actually creating a delimited set of possible worlds, any one of which might be 
actualized, depending on the free choices free agents make.  In such a world-set, God’s 
knowledge of what will be and what would be would not exhaust what God knows: God 
would also know what might and might not be.  In short, the future, in such a world, 
would be partly open.  Of course, it would also be partly settled, which is why a creation 
including conjoined might-counterfactuals does not rule out God knowing factual and 
would-counterfactual truths about the future.  The creation is a delimited set of possible 
worlds.  But this delimitation (settled aspects) leaves open genuine possibilities.
64
            
            
 When we come to Craig’s second response, we see a similar deficiency at work.  For 
here, he directly appeals to the existence of a unique “actual future” branch among all the other 
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causally possible future branches.  But, again, this would require the future to be alethically 
closed rather than open. 
 Here, then, is the situation so far.  By conceiving of “will” and “will not” as contraries 
rather than contradictories, the neo-Molinist Square is a semantic model for the alethic openness 
of the future.  When Boyd asked why such a picture couldn’t be representative of the way things 
really are, Craig’s answer was that, since the principle of bivalence holds for future contingent 
propositions, the future must be alethically closed.  But, as we saw, bivalence would only entail a 
settled future if “will” and “will not” were a contradictory pair, which the Square explicitly 
rejects.  Three arguments were then given in support of the idea that these are not a contradictory 
pair, the last of which Craig has tried to refute, twice, by appealing to the reality of an alethically 
closed future—but that is just what he’s trying to prove.        
Tentatively then, I conclude that the Square represents a genuine way the future might be.   
 
A way that, if true, would allow an open theist to maintain both a traditional sense of  
 
omniscience and a classical conception of logic.  In the remainder of this essay, I’ll defend the 
neo-Molinist Square from a different angle, arguing that the contradictory relations between 
“will” (“will not”) and “might not” (“might”) can actually be derived from Craig’s own Molinist 
assumptions.         
VI. 
 
Besides the assumption that “will” and “will not” ought to be contradictories, Craig’s 
second complaint against the Square is that such a picture illicitly mixes modal locutions 
(“might” statements) with non-modal locutions (“will” statements).  According to Craig,  
He [Boyd] is speaking his own idiolect here…In normal English, the statement that 
something will occur, but might not occur, is perfectly coherent.  That is just to affirm 
that it will occur contingently.  Boyd must be assuming that ‘will’ statements are 
36 
 
disguised modal statements to the effect that something ‘must’ occur and so can be set in 




Let’s begin by breaking these claims down.  Craig’s first two sentences are just an 
affirmation that normal discourse allows us to say, without contradiction, that something both 
“will” and “might not” occur.  Future contingent statements are supposedly a paradigmatic case 
of such discourse.  Craig’s third sentence is a claim about the assumptions he thinks must be 
operating behind Figure 1.  Specifically, he appears to be claiming that, in order to successfully 
establish the contradictory relations exhibited on the Square, Boyd has to assume two things: (a) 
future-tense indicatives are actually modal, and (b) the relevant modality in question is that of 
necessity.  With respect to (b), we’ve already seen in the previous section that “will” statements 
needn’t be construed in a causally-loaded sense in order to establish that “will” and “will not” are 
not contradictories.  In fact, I’ll argue that all the neo-Molinist needs to arrive at the opposition 
between “will” and “might not” (and, mutatis mutandis, “will not” and “might”) is to show that 
these indicatives are simply related to a certain class of conditional statement.  In this section, I 
lay the groundwork for this relation.  Then, in the following two sections, I’ll offer two 
additional lines of argument for the contradictory relations exhibited on Figure 1.  What I hope 
to show is that, in their attempts to evade the force of such arguments, traditional Molinists like 
Craig end up articulating what looks like an attenuated account of libertarian freedom.     
To start, then, think back to the picture provided in Figure 2.  This picture is the key to 
seeing how, on the Molinist picture of reality, future-tense indicatives are logically related to 
certain other conditional terms.  In particular, given Molinism, future-tense indicatives stand in a 
definite relation to counterfactual terms.  On the classical as well as the neo-Molinist model, for 
any true “will” proposition in the actual world there is a corresponding “would” counterfactual 
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proposition that logically preceded it and was known by God via his middle knowledge.  
However, just as the neo-Molinist will insist, over against other (classical) theists, that the future 
is alethically open and thus ultimately apprehended by God via his free knowledge in terms of 
what “will,” “will not,” and (in the case of future contingents) what “might and might not” occur, 
here, too, neo and classical Molinists will ultimately divide over the content of God’s middle 
knowledge.  For whereas the classical Molinist posits only two categories of counterfactual 
pertaining to the hypothetical actions of creatures at this moment in the divine mind (i.e., 
“would” and “would not” conditionals), the neo-Molinist allows for three—namely, “would,” 
“would not,” and “might and might not.”  And it is the latter sort of proposition that the neo-
Molinist maintains is needed to properly express CCFs.  Commenting on the neo-Molinist view 
of counterfactuals, Craig correctly observes that 
 A few openness theologians have attempted to accommodate the insights of Molinism by  
affirming that God does have middle knowledge of ‘might’ counterfactuals of creaturely 
freedom, even though he lacks middle knowledge of ‘would’ counterfactuals of 
creaturely freedom.  Thus, he knows logically prior to his decree what any person he 
could create might or might not do in any set of circumstances in which God should place 
him.
66
   
 
“But,” Craig asks, 
 
 if ‘might’ counterfactuals can be true logically prior to God’s decree, then why not also  
‘would’ counterfactuals [of freedom]?  It is important to understand that in the customary 
semantics for counterfactual conditionals, ‘would’ counterfactuals logically imply 





In order to answer Craig’s question, and in order to further demonstrate the validity of the 
contradictory relations on the Square, we’ll need to uncover a bit more about what Craig takes 
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these “customary semantics” to be.  As it turns out, we can find the answer in a book called 
Philosophical Foundations for a Christian Worldview.
68
  There, Craig and his colleague, 
philosopher J. P. Moreland, reveal that “for want of a better alternative, most philosophers use 
the Stalnaker-Lewis semantics.”
69
  Named after the pioneering work of philosophers Robert 
Stalnaker and David Lewis, the Stalnaker-Lewis semantics for counterfactuals is a similarity-
based approach to determining the truth of these conditionals relative to possible worlds.  
Lewis’s preferred model, for example, has us think of similarity as a “closeness” relation 
between worlds arranged into a system of spheres, $, where $ is (conceptually) structured as a 
series of concentric circles.  As Lewis explains, 
The system of spheres used in interpreting counterfactuals is meant to carry information  
about the comparative overall similarity of worlds.  Any particular sphere around a world 
i is to contain just those worlds that resemble i to at least a certain degree.  This degree is 
different for different spheres around i.  The smaller the sphere, the more similar to i must 
a world be to fall within it.
70
  
    
As Craig and Moreland elaborate, if we want to determine the truth of P □ Q from, say, 
the perspective of the actual world W, we consider the worlds in the nearest sphere centered on 
W in which the antecedent of our counterfactual is true.  If in all the worlds in which the 
antecedent is true, the consequent is also true, then a “would” counterfactual is true.  If in some 
of the worlds in which the antecedent is true, the consequent is also true, then a “might” 
counterfactual P  Q (read: “If P were the case, Q might be the case”) is true.
71
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Now, importantly, Craig seems to think that when the neo-Molinist uses the modal 
locutions “might” or “might not” in reference to future contingents, they are doing so in a way 
that is fundamentally at odds with the way those terms are understood in the counterfactual 
semantics mentioned above.  “In counterfactual discourse,” Craig avers,  
‘might’ has a technical sense that is quite different from Boyd’s usage.  Boyd uses the 
word to affirm causal indeterminism.  Counterfactual discourse pairs ‘might’ with 




We’ve already seen that by “counterfactual discourse” Craig is referring to the Stalnaker-
Lewis semantics.  But if “might” is supposed to be some kind of terminus technicus within these 
counterfactual systems, then what does it mean?  How does it function?  According to Craig, “In 
counterfactual logic P  Q is simply defined as the contradictory of P □ ¬ Q, that is to say, 
as ¬ (P □ ¬ Q).”73  Interestingly, by conceiving of the  connective in this way, Craig is 
endorsing Lewis’s “interdefinable” account of the counterfactual operators.
74
  Here’s what the 
definitions for these operators, given Lewis’s approach, look like. 
Lewisian interdefinability: 
 P  Q =def. ¬ (P □ ¬ Q), 
 P □ Q =def. ¬ (P  ¬ Q). 
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Based on these definitions, which we’ll note as Craig’s second commitment (CC2), Moreland 
and Craig construct what they call a “square of opposition for counterfactual statements”
75
 which 
is reproduced below. 
Figure 3 
                                     P □ Q                  contraries                  P □ ¬ Q 
 
 
              implies                                             implies    
                              
 
                                     P  Q              (sub)contraries              P  ¬ Q 
 But this diagram, and the interdefinability of the counterfactual connectives on which it’s 
modeled, is precisely the sort of square of opposition that the neo-Molinist would endorse for 
counterfactual conditionals.
76
  After all, it is exactly because of the logical relations shown here 
that the neo-Molinist concludes that God’s middle knowledge—like his free knowledge—must 
contain a threefold division between what “would,” “would not,” and what “might and might 
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not” occur.  Since the latter (conjunctive) type of proposition can stand in distinction from both 
“would” and “would not” counterfactuals, from a strictly logical point of view, God’s middle 
knowledge cannot be restricted merely to “would” CCFs.
77
  Indeed, in support of the logical 
relations outlined on Figure 3, Lewis tells us that  
If the ‘would’ counterfactual P □ Q is non-vacuously true, then the might 
counterfactual P  Q also is true.  If P □ Q and its opposite P □ ¬ Q are both false, 
then P  Q and its opposite P  ¬ Q are both true; for this is the case in which Q is 
true at some of the closest P-worlds and ¬ Q is true at others of them.  But when P □ Q 
is false and its opposite P □ ¬ Q is true, Q holds at none of the closest P-worlds and P 
 Q is therefore false.
78
   
 
Based on the above, we can now give an answer to Craig’s question (i.e., “But if ‘might’ 
counterfactuals can be true logically prior to God’s decree, then why not also ‘would’ 
counterfactuals [of freedom]?”).  The reason we can’t simply assume that the truth of “might” 
CCFs allow for the truth of “would” CCFs is because, as Figure 3 illustrates, while it’s true that 
would-counterfactuals imply might-counterfactuals, the relation is asymmetric.  Like “will” and 
“will not,” Lewis’s definition of “might” places “would” and “would not” in a contrary rather 
than contradictory relation.  
What this points up is an important fact—Craig’s two commitments, CC1 and CC2, are 
formally incompatible.
79
  CEM, while valid on Stalnaker’s semantics, is invalidated on Lewis’s 
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 At this point, after having been confronted with this incompatibility (and the trouble it 
poses for their conception of middle knowledge), classical Molinists often simply reject the 
standard counterfactual semantics as being “inadequate” to the task of analyzing CCFs.  Craig’s 
response is typical: “[O]bjections to middle knowledge based on its alleged incompatibility with 





  We can notice, in passing, how the following argument (borrowed from 
Jonathan Bennett) demonstrates that, by accepting CEM and Lewisian interdefinability, like 
Craig does, one actually collapses the distinction between “would” and “might.”  
(7) (P □ ¬ Q) ˅ (P □ Q)                                (CEM) 
 (8) ¬ (P □ ¬ Q)  (P □ Q)                            (from 7 by definition of “”) 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
was drafted without any consideration of the peculiar situations engendered by theism…or 
middle knowledge.  The account may simply be inadequate for the concerns of the philosopher 
of religion.  In fact, I think it is evident that the possible worlds semantics for counterfactual 
conditionals is defective, for that account cannot adequately handle counterfactuals with 
impossible antecedents.”  Craig, “Hasker on Divine Knowledge,” Philosophical Studies 67, no. 2 
(1992): 103.  Of course, the supposed difficulty of counterfactuals with impossible antecedents 
(i.e., “counterpossibles”) is, as Edward Wierenga has demonstrated, easily resolved.  
Specifically, one can avoid such difficulties and continue to accept Lewis’s interdefinable 
account of the counterfactual operators by adopting the following modification to Lewis’s 
definition: (P  Q)  ¬ (P □ ¬ Q) ˅ (P □ Q).  See Wierenga, “Theism and 
Counterpossibles,” Philosophical Studies 89, no. 1 (1998): 94.  At any rate, one wonders why, if 
the customary semantics for counterfactual conditionals are, as Craig states, ultimately 
inadequate, he would attempt to object to the neo-Molinist’s understanding of “might” CCFs 
based on an alleged misunderstanding of such semantics—as if a correct understanding would 
support the classical Molinist’s position!  As will become evident, it doesn’t.  Indeed, unlike the 
classical Molinist, it’s the neo-Molinist who, in arriving at her position, is observing and 
maintaining the proper distinctions between Stalnaker’s and Lewis’s (actual) formal semantics 
for counterfactuals.                     
  
80
 The reason is because Stalnaker assumes an anti-symmetry constraint for the similarity 
relation between possible worlds.  As Theodore Sider explains, “Anti-symmetry prohibits 
‘ties’—it says that two distinct worlds cannot be at least as close to a given world [i] as the 
other.”  Sider, Logic for Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 206.  Lewis, on 
the other hand, allows for ties in similarity to obtain between worlds (and between world 
segments).  Hence, a counterfactual describing an indeterministic event such as 
 
S: If I had tossed the coin, it might have landed heads 
 
is, as Jonathan Bennett points out, “…true [on Lewis’s interpretation] because it means that it is 
not the case that if I had tossed the coin it would have come down tails; or, in the ‘worlds’ 
dialect, Toss-worlds at which the coin comes down heads are as close to [i] as any at which it 
comes down tails” (Bennett, A Philosophical Guide to Conditionals (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2003), 191).  As such, Lewis’s semantics seem much better suited to model the 
metaphysical situation envisioned by libertarians, i.e., that there are, for any circumstances C in 




 (9) (P  Q)  (P □ Q)                                  (from 8 by Lewis’s definition of “”) 
 (10) (P □ Q)  (P  Q)                                (obvious; entailed by Lewis’s def.) 
 (11) (P □ Q)  (P  Q)                                 (from 9 & 10 by trivial logic) 
As Bennett notes, “This conclusion is patently unacceptable, so something must yield: either 
CEM or Lewis’s account of ‘might.’”
81
  From the neo-Molinist’s point of view, the truth of some 
conjoined might counterfactuals is, given libertarian freedom, much more plausible than the 
validity of CEM (or some version thereof).
82
  And, as we proceed to investigate the responses 




Having laid the requisite groundwork in the previous section, we’re now ready to state 
another argument for the neo-Molinist’s Square.  Letting “” symbolize entailment,
83
 we can 
arrive at the opposition between “will” and “might not” represented on Figure 1 by way of the 
following syllogism: 
 (12) x will occur  x would occur                      (from Figure 2) 
 (13) x would occur  not [x might not occur]    (from Figure 3) 
 (14) x will occur  not [x might not occur]        (from 12 & 13 by transitivity) 
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 Though not an open theist herself, Linda Zagzebski expresses a similar sentiment 
regarding the relation between CEM and indeterminism.  See Zagzebski, The Dilemma of 




 By entailment I mean strict implication.  Thus, p  q is equivalent to □ (p  q). 
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 Hence, it looks as if from premises endorsed by Craig himself, we can arrive at a 
conclusion, (14), which is just an affirmation of the open future Square (the same argument can 
be run, mutatis mutandis, for “will not” and “might”).  But surely no traditional Molinist would 
regard it as sound.  So how might Craig and other Molinists block it?  Perhaps the Molinist will 
concede that the argument is formally valid and would be sound if one accepted Lewis’s account 
of “”, a definition that (13) depends on.  But since such a definition is (as we’ve discovered) 
incompatible with CEM, the Molinist may be that much more inclined to give it up in order to 
deny the above conclusion.   
Unfortunately, such a move won’t work.  Even if the Molinist ends up rejecting the 
counterfactual square of opposition (Figure 3)—which they must if they insist on the validity of 
CEM—premise (13) would still be true on the assumption that CEM is valid.  This is because, 
given CEM, a “might” counterfactual would always imply the truth of a corresponding “would” 
counterfactual.  Likewise, a “might not” counterfactual would always imply a “would not” 
counterfactual.
84
  But if CEM holds, then, by definition, a true “would” counterfactual must 
mean that the corresponding “would not” counterfactual is false—which would in turn imply that 
the “might not” counterfactual is also false, just as (13) requires. 
 Of course, even if the above reasoning is sound, (13) is still potentially vulnerable.  It 
contains a term (“might not”) that appears in the conclusion as well.  And, of course, whenever a 
term is variously distributed throughout an argument one must take care that it’s being used in 
the same sense in each case.  As it so happens, the above line of reasoning resembles a similar 
argument that has, on more than one occasion, been attacked on the basis of an (alleged) 
equivocation.  In the next section, I look at this argument and the specific charges against it.  My 
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contention will be that the criticisms raised against it actually serve to highlight a reason for 
libertarians to prefer the neo-Molinist account of the openness of the future over classical 
Molinist accounts that reject it.  
VIII. 
 
Recall how Craig’s complaint at the beginning of §VI calls the very conclusion of the last 
argument into question.  There, he claimed that “…the statement that something will occur, but 
might not occur, is perfectly coherent.  That is just to affirm that it will occur contingently.”  
This complaint helps bring into focus an important issue.  Does the neo-Molinist Square, with its 
tripartite division of the future, give a better account of our libertarian intuitions than those 
classical theisms which suppose the future to be a realm of what ultimately “will or will not” be?  
On this score, Craig says no.  “Classical theists who hold to libertarian freedom,” he assures, 
“recognize that even though it may be true that someone will freely choose x, still, until the event 
actually happens, the possibility remains open that he might not choose x.”
85
    
The question I now want to explore, however, is this: What sort of possibility “remains 
open” for an agent to choose differently on such an occasion?  Can such a conception of freedom 
be distinguished as distinctly libertarian?  For as it turns out, Craig’s sentiment can be called into 
question with a well-worn little argument—indeed, a (structurally) very similar argument to the 
one given above.  Sometimes called the “Might Argument” (MA),
86
 this simple reductio, which 
relies on Figure 2 and Figure 3, can be put like this.  Suppose that freedom is incompatible with 
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and Peter Van Inwagen, “Against Middle Knowledge,” in Midwest Studies in Philosophy ed. 
Peter A. French, Theodore E. Uehling, and Howard K. Wettstein (Notre Dame, IN: University of 
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determinism.  Suppose further that it is now the case that tomorrow I will freely accept a certain 
bribe B.  Then it is true that  
(15) I will freely accept B. 
Now, if (15) is true, then, necessarily, the following CCF is true: 
 (16) If I were offered B, I would freely accept it. 
Moreover if, as (16) stipulates, it is true that I would freely accept B, then it seems plausible to 
assume that I might (freely) refrain from accepting it; that is, I might not accept it.  
But if (16) is true, then, necessarily, the following counterfactual will be false: 
 (17) If I were offered B, I might not accept it. 
So, given (15)-(17), it follows that if I will freely accept B, then, contra Craig, it’s false that I 
might not.  Such a conclusion however seems difficult to square with the claim that my 
acceptance of B was a genuinely free act. 
As with the previous argument (12-14), this conclusion follows by transitivity from (15) 
and (16).  But as far as establishing a difficulty for Craig and other Molinists who wish to affirm 
the reality of libertarian free will, MA has failed to impress.
87
  For it has seemed to critics of this 
type of argument that an improper sense of indeterminacy has been smuggled into the semantics 
of the phrase “might not.”  A kind of indeterminacy, perhaps, that is not required and therefore 
not actually necessary for my acceptance of B to be considered genuinely free.  Craig, for 
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 That’s putting it mildly.  As an argument against Molinism that has, in his view, been 
offered with “embarrassing frequency…by otherwise admirable philosophers,” Flint mockingly 
declares that “the ‘mighty’ argument is mighty weak” (Flint, “Whence and Whither the Molinist 
Debate: A Reply to Hasker,” in Molinism: The Contemporary Debate, 38-9).  However, as I 
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(at least potentially) operating with a far more attenuated account of libertarian free will than 




example, points out that if one imagines “would” counterfactuals as being incompatible with 
creaturely freedom, then that person 
has forgotten the difference between what one could do and what one might do in any set 
of circumstances.  Freedom requires only that in a given set of circumstances one be in 
some sense capable of refraining from doing what one would do; it is not required that 




Here, Craig makes it clear that the “might” (or, in this case, “might not”) in the 
requirement for freedom is not the same as the  counterfactual connective.  And this 
assumption seems ubiquitous among critics of MA.  Craig’s current position on this matter 
appears to derive from a response originally given by Edward Wierenga to Robert Adams’s oft-
cited critique of Molinist counterfactuals.
89
  In addressing Adams, Wierenga suggests that the 
reason one might be tempted to infer that an agent A “might not” choose x from the affirmation 
that A could “refrain from” choosing x may be a result of failing to properly distinguish between 
relevantly similar claims:  
(i) In C, A retained the power to do other than x. 
 (ii) It’s possible that A be in C and not do x. 
(iii) If A were in C, A might not do x.
 90
 
Indeed, Flint thinks that this distinction constitutes “all that needs to be said” to defuse MA: 
Molinists will agree that, as libertarians, we do indeed want to affirm that our free agent 
A might have acted other than she did (i.e. might have done other than X) in 
circumstances C.  But, as Wierenga notes, this intuition by itself is insufficient to 
                                                          
88
 Craig, “God Directs All Things,” 89.  
 
89
 The Adams paper I’m referring to is Robert Merrihew Adams, “Middle Knowledge 
and the Problem of Evil,” American Philosophical Quarterly 14, no. 2 (1977): 109-17.  There, 
Adams advances a version of MA against the possibility of there being true Molinist CCFs.  For 
Wierenga’s discussion, see Edward Wierenga, The Nature of God: An Inquiry into Divine 
Attributes (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989), 140-3. 
90




distinguish between the [above] claims…Only the third of these…is at odds with there 
being true ‘would’ counterfactuals.  So a Molinist can reject (iii) as the proper 
interpretation of our libertarian intuition, accept either (i) or (ii) as an adequate reading 
thereof, and thereby completely evade the force of the argument.
91
  
    
For this reason, Hasker has apparently reported that while he personally thinks MA is sound, he 
does not see any way to get a Molinist to agree that the term “might” in the phrase “might have 
done otherwise” is the same “might” of counterfactual logic.
92
   
Contrary to what Craig, Wierenga, and Flint seem to think however, I contend that the 
proponent of MA—i.e., the one who imagines “would” counterfactuals to be incompatible with 
libertarian freedom—has not, in fact, “forgotten the difference between what one could do and 
what one might do in any set of circumstances.”  Indeed, far from eschewing their differences, 
such arguments (as I’m using them) rely on the distinction between these two notions.  To see 
this, we simply need to look once again to Craig.  In the very same paragraph in which he 
approvingly gives Lewis’s definition for “”, Craig explains the relevant difference between 
the notion of “could” on the one hand, and the “might” of counterfactual logic on the other. 
‘Might’ counterfactuals should not be confused with subjunctive conditionals involving 
the word ‘could.’  ‘Could’ is taken to express mere possibility and so is a constituent of a 
modal statement expressing a possible truth.  The distinction is important because the fact 
that something could happen under certain circumstances does not imply that it might 
happen under those circumstances.  ‘Might’ is more restrictive than ‘could’ and indicates 
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This account of the “might” counterfactual operator, of course, follows Lewis’s usual 
usage.
94
  And it is more than a bit baffling why Craig would suppose that the neo-Molinist 
description of causally indeterminate events in terms of what “might and might not” occur is at 
odds with it.  On the contrary, as we’ve seen above, the open future Square represented by 
Figure 1 is derived from (and thus supported by) it.  What’s even more baffling, however, is 
how the classical Molinist thinks they can maintain a plausible libertarian interpretation of the 
idea that an agent “might have acted other than she did” in some set of circumstances when, in 
rejecting Lewis’s account of , they thereby deny that (freely) doing otherwise was a 
“genuine, live option” under those circumstances.  Flint, for instance, has tried to suggest that all 
the libertarian intuition amounts to is merely the idea that, “If I do [x] freely, then I could have 
failed to do [x] freely.”
95
  But this can’t possibly be a sufficient account of a distinctly libertarian 
view of free will.  After all, the alternative option to “freely doing x” on such an account could 
be fulfilled by being causally constrained or coerced into doing x since, in such cases, the 
condition “failed to do x freely” would be satisfied.  But this is an account of freedom that any 
Frankfurtian-compatibilist could affirm.   
The open theist will contend that Flint has the wording backwards.  What is required for 
my doing x freely in the libertarian sense is not merely that I could “fail to do x freely,” but 
rather that I could freely fail to do x (i.e., freely refrain from doing x).  In other words, having the 
ability to freely choose x on a particular occasion is an ability to choose between alternative 
courses of action and, so, requires that I both (a) have alternate courses of action, and (b) have 
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the ability to determine which course I will take on that particular occasion.  But what sense of 
“freedom” remains if I cannot genuinely refrain from doing something on a particular occasion?  
In rejecting the account of “might” that the neo-Molinist employs in the above arguments for 
arriving at the Square, this becomes the question the classical Molinist has to answer.     
IX. 
 
As I alluded in the previous section, despite their claims to the contrary, I do not believe 
that the opponents of MA have given a reply sufficient to rebut it.  More specifically, by 
themselves, I do not believe that either (i) or (ii) can ground a distinctly libertarian conception of 
freedom since, without the relevant restrictions provided by the notion of “might” in (iii), any 
compatibilist could affirm them.  However, since I cannot possibly survey all the interpretive 
options available to the classical Molinist here, I shall, in the interest of modesty, merely point 
out two potential areas of concern.  Areas in which, unlike the neo-Molinist, the classical 
Molinist appears to be left with a truncated account of free will.   
Here, again, are the relevant claims: 
 (i) In C, A retained the power to do other than x. 
 (ii) It’s possible that A be in C and not do x. 
 Let’s begin with (i).  Here the relevant notion of “power” for the Molinist is 
counterfactual power, specifically counterfactual power over the past.  Craig points out that the 
Molinist will insist that, in C, it lies within A’s power to do not-x, and if not-x were to occur, then 
the past would have been different than it in fact is.  “Suppose,” Craig writes, 
 that God has always believed that in the year [2016] I would accept an invitation to speak  
at the University of Regensburg.  Up until the time arrives I have the ability to accept or 
refuse the invitation.  If I were to refuse the invitation, then God would have held a 
different belief than the one he in fact held.  For if I were to refuse the invitation, then 
51 
 
different counterfactual propositions would have been true, and God would have known 




So understood, the Molinist’s notion of counterfactual power seems to clearly require what 
Kevin Timpe calls an “alternative possibilities condition” (AP) for freedom: 
AP: a person has free will only if he could have done otherwise.
97
 
Belief in such a condition for free will has led many libertarians to endorse the following 
prominent argument for incompatibilism: 
 (18) Free will requires the ability to do otherwise. 
 (19) If determinism is true, then no agent has the ability to do otherwise. 
 (20) Therefore, free will requires the falsity of determinism. 
Timpe calls this the “Core Argument for Incompatibilism.”
98
  And, as Mares and Perszyk 
argue, the Molinist seems obliged to accept the AP condition articulated in (18): 
Molinism itself seems to entail AP (or something AP-like)…To say that I have 
counterfactual power over a true [CCF] about me just means or is equivalent to the claim 
that there is something I can do in circumstances C, e.g. ¬ A, such that, if I were to do it, 
C □ A would be false.  So, if I could not do otherwise in C, I would lack counterfactual 
power over a true [CCF] about me.  If we lacked counterfactual power over any true 
[CCFs] about us, a Consequence-type Argument for the incompatibility of Molinism with 
freedom would look pretty decisive.  If I could have (freely) refrained from doing A, but 
the truth of C □ A together with its antecedent entail that I do not refrain, then I must 
have or had counterfactual power over the counterfactual (or its antecedent).  So, we have 
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counterfactual power over true [CCFs] about us if and only if we can do other than what 
the consequents say we will do.
99
    
   
Now, neo-Molinists like Boyd can (and do) readily endorse AP.  But if Mares and 
Perszyk are right about AP being a necessary condition for the classical Molinist’s conception of 
counterfactual power, then it looks like Flint and Craig are going to be in a potentially 
uncomfortable position.  For as we saw above, it doesn’t appear that Flint actually thinks AP is 
required for freedom.  And Craig, in fact, explicitly rejects AP.  Indeed, in response to Boyd’s 
affirmation that libertarian free will involves “the capacity to choose to go this way or that 
way,”
100
 Craig retorts:  
I find Boyd’s analysis of libertarian freedom as involving the power of alternative 
possibilities to be defective…what is essential to libertarian freedom is not the possibility 
of choosing otherwise but rather the absence of causal constraints outside oneself that 
determine how one chooses.  As Boyd puts it, libertarian freedom requires that we have 




We thus have a third commitment of Craig’s: 
 CC3: Non-AP freedom    
Any incompatibilist who accepts CC3 as an adequate account of free will, however, is 
not only rejecting the Core Argument (18-20) for libertarian freedom, they’re also flirting with 
the following line of reasoning: 
 (21) Genuine freedom is compatible with not being able to do otherwise. 
 (22) Not being able to do otherwise is compatible with determinism. 
 (23) Therefore, genuine freedom is compatible with determinism. 
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Of course, as self-professed incompatibilists with respect to freedom and determinism, Craig and 
other Molinists will ultimately reject the notion that genuine freedom is compatible with 
determinism.  These considerations help to pinpoint Craig’s brand of incompatibilism.  For 
insofar as one rejects the compatibility of determinism and freedom (as any libertarian must), but 
offers CC3 as an adequate analysis of that freedom, one is thereby endorsing a view that has 
come to be termed “Source Incompatibilism.”
102
  Unlike so-called “Leeway Incompatibilists,” 
i.e., libertarians who see AP as a central component of any adequate account of free will, Source 
Incompatibilists maintain that AP is not the primary component of freedom.  Moreover, Craig’s 
claim that alternative possibilities aren’t even “essential” to free will seems to further pin him as 
being what Timpe (following a suggestion made by Robert Kane) calls a “Narrow” rather than a 
“Wide” Source Incompatibilist.
103
  As Timpe explains, 
Narrow Source Incompatibilists will be those who think that an agent having free will 
with respect to some action A is a matter of the agent being the proper source of A, and 
that being the proper kind of source doesn’t require alternative possibilities at all.  The 
term ‘narrow’ here is intended to capture the idea that, on this view, alternative 
possibilities are outside the scope of what is required for moral responsibility.  Those 
incompatibilists who reject all AP principles are thus Narrow Source Incompatibilists.  
Wide Source Incompatibilists, on the other hand, take a broader, more inclusive approach 
to free will.  These incompatibilists insist that what is most fundamental to free will is 
ultimacy or sourcehood, but still maintain that there is some AP-like condition that is also 
true insofar as it is implied by the sourcehood condition, and that in virtue of this 




 Thus, as we saw in the last section, because they embrace both conditions (a) and (b) for 
free will, neo-Molinists would be much closer to Wide Source Incompatibilists than Narrow 
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Source Incompatibilists when it comes to freedom and responsibility.  And here’s why.  The neo-
Molinist recognizes what many other libertarians have also recognized, namely, that defining 
freedom as the mere “absence of external causal constraints,” as Craig does, can’t deliver a 
sufficient condition for what most free will advocates believe freedom is essential for—moral 
responsibility.  Specifically, the reason why sourcehood, or “wholehearted identification,” cannot 
by itself ground free will is because such a sparse account of libertarian freedom cannot rule out 
scenarios that would potentially devastate any notion of moral responsibility.  These are, of 
course, scenarios involving manipulation.  After all, as Robert Kane has suggested, manipulation 
scenarios can be cases of “nonconstraining control,” whereby 
the controllers do not get their way by constraining or coercing others against their wills, 
but rather by manipulating the wills of others so that the others (willingly) do what the 
controllers desire.  The controlled agents consequently do not feel frustrated or thwarted.  
They act in accordance with their own wants, desires or intentions.  Yet they are 
controlled nevertheless by others who have manipulated their circumstances so that they 




 Recently, Dean Zimmerman has argued that exactly this sort of control is possible for the 
God of classical Molinism.
106
  And as one might expect, given such a minimal account of free 
will as Craig’s, in his response to Zimmerman Craig has revealed that the Molinist ultimately 
would have no problem with such cases of control.  Here’s how Craig summarizes Zimmerman’s 
objection: 
…given that the circumstances C in which an agent is placed are non-determining, it 
must be a brute, contingent fact how some person s would choose in C.  But then it is 
plausible that there are an indefinite number of circumstances C* that differ from C in 
imperceptible or causally irrelevant ways (for example, a different stellar event in Alpha 
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Centauri at the time of S’s decision), in which S would choose differently than in C.  So 
God by placing S in one of these circumstances C* could bring it about that S choose 





To be sure, Craig objects to this argument in numerous places, but what’s important to note is 
this—he contends that even if such control were possible and utilized by God, we would still be 
free in the relevant sense.  As he puts it, 
What is the import of such an objection?  It does nothing, I think, to undermine the 
Molinist account of providence as such.  In particular it does not in any way undermine 
the freedom of the creatures in whatever circumstances they find themselves, for their 
choices are in every case causally undetermined.  If a choice is freely made in C, then it 
would be freely made in C* which includes some causally irrelevant event not included 
in C.  If God places S in C, then S’s freedom is not compromised by the mere fact that 
had God placed S in C* instead, S would have chosen differently.
108
  
    
  The fact that Craig thinks such a scenario would count as an instance of significant 
freedom though is astonishing.  It is astonishing because, elsewhere, Craig has cited 1 
Corinthians 10:13 as a paradigmatic example of libertarian freedom in the Bible.  This passage 
promises that God “will not allow you to be tempted beyond what you are able, but with the 
temptation will provide the way of escape also, that you may be able to endure it.”  Craig claims 
that, based on this passage, “It follows that any Christian who does not in some circumstance 
endure but succumbs to temptation had it within his power to take the way of escape instead, i.e., 
had the liberty of opposites in those circumstances.”
109
   
But why should this be?  If Craig sees no problem with the possibility of manipulation 
cases like the ones envisioned by Zimmerman for morally significant freedom, then, as we’ve 
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already seen Craig make clear, fulfilling the AP condition for free will—that is, having the 
“liberty of opposites”—is not an essential aspect of libertarian freedom.  For as Craig said above, 
“If God places S in C, then S’s freedom is not compromised by the mere fact that had God placed 
S in C* instead, S would have chosen differently.”  But suppose that, unlike S’s choice in C*, S’s 
choice in C is one for which S will be held morally blameworthy.  Then, by purposely placing S 
in C rather than C*, God would be denying an avenue open to S in which S freely chose the 
good.  But then God would be allowing S to be in a situation that Scripture promises God 
wouldn’t allow—that is, S would be in a situation in which an alternative course of action she 
could freely take (i.e., C* or, in this case, “the way of escape”) has been withheld.  By being 
deliberately put in such a situation, however, it is difficult to see how S could rightly be held 
morally responsible for her action.   
For reasons such as these, Timpe has persuasively argued that an agent can only be free 
and responsible if she is the source of her choices in a way that requires the falsity of 
determinism and the lack of manipulation.
110
  “But,” Timpe says, “if these conditions are met, 
then the agent will also have alternative possibilities for action.”
111
  So (i), understood without a 
robust AP condition like that available with the “might” of (iii), leads to consequences that are at 
least highly counterintuitive to libertarianism.           
  What about (ii) then?  What sense of possibility is in view here apart from (iii)?  Craig 
has already told us.  “‘Could’ is taken to express mere possibility…a bare logical possibility.”  
The problem here, however, is that while logical possibility is certainly a necessary condition for 
a libertarian account of “could have done otherwise,” it in no way constitutes a sufficient 
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condition for such freedom.  For, again, any compatibilist could affirm the relative strength of 
this modality.  Libertarians overwhelmingly affirm a stronger, more restrictive sense of possible, 
one that allows for us to have done not-x in at least some of the nearest possible worlds to the 
actual one where we, in fact, freely do x.  But as we’ve seen, it is Lewis’s definition of “might” 
that provides such an account.  And, so, to affirm this is just to affirm that (iii) is the correct 
interpretation of “might have done other than x” after all. 
 These considerations are, of course, far from exhaustive.  They are also far from decisive.  
But what they reveal is something important.  When Craig affirms that, for some person S who 
will freely choose x, still, until the event actually happens, the “possibility remains open” that S 
might not choose x, he’s saying something that, without the aid of this present study, would be 
hard to decipher.  For by rejecting the account of “might” that the neo-Molinist argues to Figure 
1 from, he’s not saying something that a libertarian would automatically think is being said.  
He’s not saying that S actually had alternative possibilities available to her.  Nor is he saying that 
the possibility of S’s choosing otherwise was anything more than a mere, broadly logical 
possibility.  And so, perhaps with a tinge of irony, while a good portion of this essay has been 
spent merely defending the Square, it may be that Craig has (indirectly) given a sort of argument 
here for why libertarians really ought to embrace it. 
X. 
In this thesis I have explored the cogency of the neo-Molinist account of the openness of 
the future.  I’ve investigated whether the relation between future contingent statements asserting 
what “will,” “will not,” and what “might and might not” occur, as conceived on Gregory Boyd’s 
Square of Opposition, can provide a model of reality for free-will theists that preserves classical 
conceptions of (i) omniscience, (ii) logic, and (iii) morally significant freedom, and concluded 
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that it can.  I’ve also uncovered an interesting fact along the way.  Craig and other Molinists who 
reject the Lewisian interpretation of “might” as understood and used in MA-style arguments 
reveal a potentially impoverished sense of what is supposed to be one of the “twin bases” of 
Molinism.
112
  But, of course, while not being exhaustive of potential Molinist responses to that 
charge, it remains an open possibility that some might and might not agree. 
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